Growth and the internet: surfing to prosperity? by David Altig & Peter Rupert
In the late nineteenth century, the econ-
omist Thomas Malthus made a simple
prediction of economic theory that would
result in the discipline being forthwith
known as the dismal science. The pes-
simistic extrapolation for which Malthus
is famed foretold of long economic
cycles in which widespread famine must
be an inevitable part. 
Malthus’s proposition relied on the
entirely valid principle of diminishing
returns, the tendency for the incremental
returns to labor (or any input into the pro-
ductive process) to fall as more and more
of it is employed. The argument goes as
follows: The amount of cultivatable land
available to feed a society is effectively
fixed. As the population grows and more
and more people apply their labor to the
production of food, the additional fruits
of that labor decline, reflecting dimin-
ishing returns. But that, by definition,
means that production per worker falls.
In Malthus’s calculation, average food
output would ultimately decline to levels
insufficient to avoid famine.1 The some-
what gruesome outcome would be a rise
in mortality that would persist until the
population declined enough to allow
marginal workers to produce at the level
necessary for sustenance.
From the vantage of industrialized, non-
agrarian economies, Malthus’s prediction
appears quaint and obviously wrong. The
real shortcoming in Malthus’s analysis
was in part due to the fact that he omitted
the role of reproducible factors of pro-
duction other than labor (capital, for
instance). But even more critically, he
neglected the powerful and pervasive
influence of technological advance. In
fact, some estimates imply that techno-
logical advance in capital accounts for
about 50 percent of long-term growth in
advanced economies.2
Although this statement has a nice
precise ring to it, it is not all that pre-
cisely defined, except in a rather trivial
sense. As a matter of (what is now) tradi-
tional growth accounting, disembodied
technological advance is just that com-
ponent of gross domestic product (GDP)
growth that cannot be accounted for by
the growth in quantities of capital and
labor. In other words, it is the residual
growth that cannot be accounted for by
inputs that can actually be measured. A
cynic might think of it as a measure of
our ignorance.
With some interpretative leeway, techno-
logical progress can be thought of as the
inexorable march of human know-how,
that amorphous, hard-to-pin-down, but
very real capability that provides the
means for wealth creation in excess of the
rate at which productive inputs expand.
Because this definition says nothing
about whether an economy adopts a new
technology, it implies that all economies
should share equally in the benefits of
technology growth; once a technology is
invented, the definition sees it as avail-
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able to all. Our experience tells us quite
the opposite, of course. All economies
do not simultaneously benefit from tech-
nological progress.
There are a number of factors which
explain the uneven distribution of tech-
nological innovations. Patents and other
inventor rights may inhibit the wide-
spread use of newer technologies. Profit-
maximizing motives may induce some
firms to maintain older vintages of capi-
tal even when more advanced tools,
equipment, or manufacturing facilities
are available.3 And any number of
social, political, and legal elements may
make the practical application of emerg-
ing production capabilities more rapid in
some countries than others. These fac-
tors are just different, not mutually ex-
clusive, explanations for why economies
may differ in the rate at which they
adopt new technologies.The natural presumption is that those
countries most able to implement newer
technologies will do so, and will thus
enjoy the fastest economic growth, at
least in the early stages of the technolo-
gies’life-cycles. Is this presumption
warranted?
This is the question addressed in this
Economic Commentary. The focus is on
the adoption of computer technology
specifically, which we will attempt to
capture by exploring country-specific
levels of Internet use. Our hypothesis
has two key elements. First, we propose
that average cross-country growth rates
since the mid-1970s can be partially
explained by the absorption rate of
emerging computer technologies. Sec-
ond, this rate can be proxied by the
breadth of Internet usage across the dif-
ferent economies that we examine.
The result of our analysis is that Internet
use does seem to be related to the pace
of economic expansion over the past
several decades. Because the United
States has been ahead in such usage rela-
tive to comparably developed countries,
one prediction might be that the growth
rates in, for instance, Japan and Western
Europe will accelerate relative to the
United States as the deployment of com-
puter technologies in those countries
converge to American levels. 
 The Internet and Growth: 
AFirst Pass
The highest concentrations of Internet
usage are found in the Nordic countries,
the United States, and Canada. Not sur-
prisingly, many emerging economies
report little or no usage.
Figure 1 plots average GDP growth
against Internet use. The graph includes
data for a representative set of countries
—42 total, 33 of which reported some
degree of Internet use, and 9 of which
reported none.4  Specifically, figure 1
plots GDPgrowth in each of these coun-
tries against the fraction of people in that
country who reported using the Internet.
As noted, the proposition in this Eco-
nomic Commentary has two components.
The first is that higher rates of technol-
ogy adoption result in higher rates of out-
put growth. The second is that Internet
usage in a country is a reasonably good
proxy for all of the factors which pro-
mote or inhibit the adoption (or rate of
adoption) of new technologies, at least
over the period covered in figure 1. If
both of these conditions are true, then a
line drawn through the points ought to
have an upward slope, rising from the
lower left-hand corner of the graph
toward the upper right-hand corner.
It is clear that the points in figure 1 do not
demonstrate the presumed positive rela-
tionship between growth and Internet use.
In fact, the points in the figure seem to
draw a picture of a negative relationship,
suggesting that a higher fraction of the
population using the Internet is associated
with lower average GDPgrowth. One
obvious explanation is that one or both of
the maintained assumptions are not true:
Either growth is not related to the pace of
technology adoption or the adoption rate
is not captured by Internet use.
There is another, not too strained, expla-
nation. It is possible that a second “X-
factor” has contributed to GDPexpan-
sion in addition to Internet penetration.
If such a factor were negatively related
to the average rate of economic growth
and positively related to the fraction of
the population with Internet access, it
could obscure the underlying relation-
ship between Internet use and growth. If
the influence of the X-factor is strong
enough, failing to control for its effects
could impart a downward slope to the
plot in figure 1, even if the relationship
between growth and the Internet is posi-
tive when all else is held constant.
Is there a candidate X-factor? Yes, and it
is illustrated in figure 2, which is the
same as figure 1 but with country names
added to identify individual points.
Notice that among those countries that
exhibit high average GDPgrowth and
low Internet adoption are the so-called
“Asian tigers.” These are the growth
miracles, the economies that expanded
rapidly from low levels of GDPfollow-
ing World War II. 
This observation is important because
well-known theories of economic
growth predict that observed rates of
economic growth over snapshots of time
will be negatively related to the level of
GDPfrom which the growth measure-
ment begins. In other words, the lower
the level of GDPat the beginning of the
period, the faster an economy’s growth
is. Because it also likely that Internet use
is a normal good (and hence positively
related to the level of income), there
clearly exists the potential for a spurious
correlation to show through in a picture
like figure 1.
To address this problem, the Internet/
growth relationship should be examined
after statistically controlling for the ini-
tial level of GDPin each country in the
study. Before proceeding to that exer-
cise, however, it may help to provide
some intuition as to the role that such
level effects exert on cross-country
growth observations.
 Why Poorer Countries Grow
FasterThan Richer Ones
The most basic of accepted growth theo-
ries is associated with work done in the
1950s by economists Robert Solow and
Trevor Swan. The Solow–Swan frame-
work, often referred to as the neoclassical
growth model, postulates that, in the long
run, the rate of growth is tied to an
“exogenous” rate of technological ad-
vance. The term “exogenous” means that
the theory does not explain why technol-
ogy (or, equivalently, productivity) ex-
pands—it just does, and with it comes
the ability to produce more with the same
amount of land, labor, and capital.
One implication of this view is that, in
the long run, all economies respond to
technology growth in the same way,
growing at a given rate of technology
expansion (a prediction that is usually
called the “convergence hypothesis”).
However, economies that are some dis-
tance from their long-run growth paths
will tend to grow faster as they “catch
up” to their ultimate rate of expansion. 
Roughly, think of the process as follows:
At low levels of income, the capital stock
of an economy is also relatively low. But
that means there is a lot of bang for the
buck in investment that raises the amount
of capital available for production. As the
capital stock grows and the economy
matures, the incremental boost to produc-
tion from investment declines from the
higher levels associated with the begin-ning of the growth process. Eventually,
the returns from investment will settle
into levels comparable to those of more
developed economies, and with that,
rates of GDPincrease will converge to
the common long-run experience.
Statistical studies of cross-country
growth patterns suggest that these types
of effects are of real-world importance.
Before concluding that there is no rela-
tionship between growth and the Inter-
net—or anything else, for that matter—
it is reasonable to control for possible
convergence effects by adjusting for any
influences on cross-country growth pat-
terns that can be attributed to start-of-
sample GDPlevels. 
 The Internet and Growth: 
ASecond Look
In fact, once we control for convergence
effects, a positive relationship between
growth and Internet use is significant in
both statistical and economic terms. To
give some idea of the magnitude of the
relationship, our simple empirical exer-
cise yields an estimate that implies 100
percent Internet usage would be associ-
ated with almost four percentage points
of economic growth.5
This is a very large number. Frankly, too
large to be believable on its face. It is
certainly true that factors beyond Inter-
net use might help to explain economic
growth, and that we have omitted such
factors (excepting the initial postwar
GDPlevel that we introduced to control
for convergence effects). It is very likely
that the Internet usage proxy might pick
up the influences of some of these other
contributors. 
In other words, we suggest that the Inter-
net variable captures, in part, the constel-
lation of hard-to-measure factors that
influence technology adoption. For
example, the percentage of the popula-
tion with Internet access might be
related to the absence of onerous regula-
tions in the communications industry, or
low taxes that make computer ownership
more broadly accessible, and so on. In
fact, this possibility is what motivated
the inclusion of the Internet variable as a
proxy for technology adoption in the
first place. The magnitude of the effects
we identify in our simple statistical exer-
cise are therefore more plausible to the
extent that Internet penetration is captur-
ing the wide array of considerations that
affect the speed at which economies are
able to exploit technological advances. 
   Who’s Got Mail?
Because the level of development is an
important determinant of observed
cross-country growth rates, comparing
apples to apples is most easily accom-
plished by considering economies that
are at like levels of development. With
that in mind, we will compare Internet
usage in the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan.
As of 1999, 45 percent of households in
the United States owned personal com-
puters. The corresponding statistic in
Europe is only about half that, at 23 per-
cent. In Japan it is even lower, with only
17 percent of households reporting own-
ership of at least one PC. In addition, vir-
tually 100 percent of computers sold in
the U.S. have modems, a pretty good
indication of Internet communications
accessibility. In Europe, by contrast,
only about 50 percent of new personal
computers sold come equipped with
modems.
This disparity in home computer use evi-
dently extends to the business commu-
nity as well. Asurvey conducted in the
United Kingdom of the directors of large
companies found that, in the United
States, nearly 100 percent reported using
computers. The same survey found that
only 84 percent of German directors em-
ployed computers in their business activ-
ities. In England, affirmative responses
fell to two-thirds of those surveyed.
The picture that these facts draw is rein-
forced by the statistics on computer
technology expenditure shares. In 1998,
roughly 4.08 percent of U.S. real GDP
was spent on information technology
hardware. The shares in Japan and
Western Europe were 2.51 percent and
2.26 percent, respectively.
   Surfing to Prosperity? 
In our own thinking about the results of
our analysis, we interpret Internet use as
a general proxy for the constellation of
factors that influence the rate at which
economies adopt and absorb emerging
technologies. The very same elements
that inhibit widespread public access to
the Internet—high taxes, labor market
policies that raise the costs of produc-
tion, capital market imperfections and
regulations that retard the creation of
start-up enterprises, tariffs, and so on—
are likely to more broadly interfere with
optimizing the promise of technological
progress. In other words, economic
infrastructure matters, and those policies
and regulations that interfere with cre-
ative access to new technologies have a
very real negative impact on the wealth
of nations.
What to make of all this, then? Focus-
ing on recent economic development
patterns, real GDP in the United States
expanded by almost 29 percent from
1988 through the end of 1998. Over 
the same period, output growth in 
both Europe and Japan was in the 
23 percent–24 percent neighborhood.
FIGURE 1 GDP GROWTH, 1974–92
FIGURE 2 GDP GROWTH, 1974–92
WITH COUNTRY NAMES
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Com-
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AustraliaIt would be far-fetched, to say the least,
to attribute these differentials to the dis-
crepancies in Internet usage. Nonethe-
less, it does appear that the fraction of a
country’s population that has access to
the Internet is, at least, correlated with
factors that help to explain average
growth performance. This in itself may
have some important policy implications
that bear further consideration. Whether
by means of the gradual process of
working around impediments to technol-
ogy adoption or the relaxation of the
policies that create those impediments,
one might suppose that as we see  in-
creasing computer technology penetra-
tion in Europe and Japan in the next
decade, we will also see the closing of
the growth gaps between the United
States and these major trading partners
that have emerged over the course of the
past ten years. 
 Footnotes
1. The precise formula postulated that popu-
lation growth was exponential but food pro-
duction geometric.
2. These numbers are taken from Michael
Gort, Jeremy Greenwood, and Peter Rupert,
“Measuring the Rate of Technological
Progress in Structures.” Review of Economic
Dynamics, vol. 2, no. 1, January, 1999.
3. See Michael Gort, Jeremy Greenwood,
and Peter Rupert “How Much of Economic
Growth is Fueled by Investment-specific
Technological Progress?” Economic Com-
mentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
March 1, 1999.
4. The data on Internet use were compiled by
International Communications, a firm spe-
cializing in international business services.
All of the Internet use data reported here can
be found on the company’s Web site at
http://www.headcount.com.
5. This number is obtained from the simple
linear regression estimates: 
(real GDPgrowth rate) = 0.0959–
0.010*(real GDPin 1950) + 0.0372*(fraction
of the population using the Internet).  Our
model amounts to calculating the correlation
between growth rates and the Internet vari-
able after subtracting out variations in growth
that are attributable to 1950 GDPlevels.
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